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ABSTRACT 
 Introduced in 2016, Virginia House Bill 48 proposed civil forfeiture 
reforms which would raise the burden of proof required for law enforce-
ment agencies to seize property related to criminal activity. Civil forfeiture 
has grown in recent decades to deprive innocent property owners of their 
belongings, often due to connections between the property seized and per-
sons accused of using the property illegally without the owners’ consent. 
Additionally, with a burden of proof much lower than the standard that 
must be met for a criminal conviction, civil forfeiture as it stands now risks 
depriving property owners of their possessions despite a lack of sufficient 
evidence of guilt. This Comment presents a brief history of civil asset forfei-
ture in the United States, describes current federal and Virginia law on the 
subject, summarizes the components of House Bill 48 and concludes by ar-
guing in favor of civil asset reforms like those seen in H.B. 48. 
INTRODUCTION 
“I was so upset thinking somebody’s going to take my house for noth-
ing,” Christos Sourovelis said, shaking his head.1 In 2014, Sourovelis’ son 
was arrested for selling $40 of illegal drugs outside their family home. 
Ninety days later, the police returned with a civil lawsuit against the 
$350,000 Sourovelis house, immediately forcing the family out onto the 
street.2 Neither Christos, nor his wife, had any knowledge of their son’s il-
licit activities, but this nightmare was made possible through civil asset for-
feiture.3 
The Sourovelis story is no isolated incident. As the Washington Post re-
vealed in a recent investigative series, multiple motorists, who had not been 
charged with crimes, had property confiscated by police. Mandrel Stuart of 
Staunton, Virginia, lost $17,550 when he was stopped by Fairfax County 
police in Northern Virginia for a minor traffic infraction; John Anderson 
lost $25,000 after being pulled over for waiting too long to signal while 
                                                
1 Pamela Brown, Parents’ House Seized After Son’s Drug Bust, CNN (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/03/us/philadelphia-drug-bust- house-seizure/. 
2 Id.; Jeremy Roebuck, D.A.’s Office Reaches Partial Settlement in Forfeiture Suit, PHILA. INQUIRER 
(June 25, 2015), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20150625_Phila__District_Attorney_reaches_partial_settlement_in_
civil_forfeiture_suit.html. 
3 Brown, supra note 1. 
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changing lanes in Nebraska; and the list goes on.4 Once the property is 
seized, even without a conviction or charge, a property owner is not able to 
retrieve his or her assets without going through legal procedures that place 
the burden of proving innocence on the property owner. Stuart, a thirty-five 
year old African American owner of a small barbeque restaurant, rejected a 
settlement with the government for half of his money that was seized and 
demanded a jury trial.5 Stuart eventually got his money back, but lost his 
restaurant in the process by dedicating large amounts of time and money to 
the contestation.6 
Civil forfeiture is a legal proceeding where the government brings a civil 
action – which is remedial, not punitive like a criminal proceeding – against 
property. By acting civilly, the government seeks to remedy a harm through 
the judicial fiction of the property’s guilt.7 Although the Supreme Court 
holds civil asset forfeiture has long existed in our nation’s history,8 follow-
ing the attacks on September 11, 2001, law enforcement agencies were en-
couraged to act more aggressively in searching for suspicious people, drugs, 
and other contraband.9 The departments of Justice and Homeland Security 
began funneling millions of dollars into police training for the hard-hitting 
searches, and the effort succeeded.10 However, perhaps the greatest impact 
is one largely blinded from the public’s eye: the growth of civil asset forfei-
ture. 
Progressive and conservative groups, alike, have actively tried to reform 
civil forfeiture laws.11 In response to public outcry, some states have re-
evaluated these laws in an attempt to protect the property rights of innocent 
                                                
4 Robert O’Harrow Jr., Steven Rich, Michael Sallah, & Gabe Silverman, Stop and Seize: Aggressive 
Police Take Hundreds of Millions of Dollars from Motorists Not Charged with Crimes, WASHINGTON 
POST, Sept. 6, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/. See 
generally Brad Reid, An Overview of Civil Asset Forfeiture and Recent Cases, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 
14, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brad-reid/civil-asset-forfeiture-ch_b_3745209.html; DICK M. 
CARPENTER ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 4 & 9 (Institute for 
Justice, 2015), http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_ folder/other_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf. 
5 O’Harrow Jr., supra note 4. 
6 Id. 
7 Forfeiture, THE LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forfeiture (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2016). 
8 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 446-47 (1996); see also The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1827). 
9 O’Harrow Jr., supra note 4. 
10  Id. (referencing the investment in police training that resulted in more aggressive search and sei-
zures.) 
11  Kanya Bennett & Nkechi Taifa, There Is Bipartisan Agreement on the ‘Uncivility” of Civil Asset 
Forfeiture, ACLU (Apr. 20, 2015, 3:00PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/washington-markup/there-
bipartisan-agreement-uncivility-civil-asset-forfeiture. 
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third parties. Despite this response, according to the Institute for Justice, 
only seven states earn a B-rating or higher on their civil forfeiture laws.12 
The Virginia General Assembly should reform its civil asset forfeiture 
laws because taking one’s property without establishing guilt presents due 
process concerns and the policy has evolved into a form of potential polic-
ing abuse. Virginia House Bill 48 is a positive step forward.  The law would 
require a finding of guilt before property suspected of being used in connec-
tion with the commission of a crime is forfeited to the Commonwealth.13 
Under this legislation, Virginians would receive much more protection from 
civil asset forfeitures. 
Part I of this comment explains the constitutional theory behind civil for-
feiture. Part II outlines both the current federal and Virginia legal land-
scapes addressing civil forfeiture and associated problems. Part III details 
Virginia House Bill 48, introduced in the 2016 Virginia General Assembly 
Session to address civil forfeiture concerns, and proposes potential contem-
porary policy reform. 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL FICTION OF CIVIL FORFEITURE 
 The Supreme Court holds civil forfeiture has long existed in the fab-
ric of our laws, and is therefore constitutional.14 In Bennis, a woman fought 
the seizure of her car, which she jointly owned with her husband, after her 
husband was caught having sex with a prostitute in the vehicle.15 By citing 
The Palmyra, an 1827 admiralty case, and claiming, “the cases authorizing 
actions of the kind at issue are too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial 
jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced,” the Supreme Court up-
held the seizure with the then-new “facilitating property” theory. 16  
It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the 
innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws 
of the United States is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth 
                                                
12 CARPENTER II, supra note 4, at 22 (showing that the Institute for Justice grades each State based on 
three elements: the financial incentive for law enforcement to seize, the government’s standards of proof 
to forfeit, and who bears the burden in innocent owners claims). 
13 H.B. 48, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (unenacted), available at 
https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?161+sum+HB48. 
14 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 446-47 (1996). 
15 Id. at 443. 
16 Id. at 453 (Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, affirms the seizure of the Bennis vehicle 
because, “[t]he Bennis automobile...facilitated...in criminal activity.”). 
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Amendment [...] [t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or 
rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing.”17 
The Bennis decision expands the scope of civil forfeiture to include 
property that is connected with facilitating the commission of a crime, even 
when an innocent owner is involved.18 Justice Stevens dissented, asserting, 
“Even judged in isolation, the remedial interest in this forfeiture falls far 
short of that which we have found present.”19 Stevens argues no sufficient 
nexus exists between the Bennis automobile and the offense her husband 
committed.20 Mrs. Bennis was entirely without responsibility for the 
crime.21 As Stevens predicted in 1996, the Bennis analysis permits the 
States to exercise “virtually unbridled power” to confiscate vast amounts of 
property where criminals have engaged in illegal acts.22 
II. CURRENT FEDERAL LAW AND VIRGINIA LAW ADDRESSING CIVIL ASSET 
FORFEITURE 
Although civil asset forfeiture was only recently elevated to national 
concern, it is hardly a new problem.23 What was once an arcane procedure 
used in old admiralty practices has grown into an aggressive brand of polic-
ing by government. This modern iteration of a once forgotten practice per-
mits the seizure of hundreds of millions of dollars in cash, property, and 
real property from Americans who have not been charged with crimes.24 In 
fact, through the use of criminal and civil asset forfeiture, the federal gov-
ernment seized $29 billion in assets between 2001 and 2014, including $2.5 
billion in cash without warrants or indictments and $4.5 billion of assets in 
2014, alone.25 Eighty seven percent of those assets were taken through civil 
forfeiture, not requiring a conviction.26 These numbers certainly call for 
some concern, but the call to action has yielded little reform.   
                                                
17 Id. at 447, 448 (internal quotations omitted); see also The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14 (1827) (stating that, 
in 1827, the United States captured the Palmyra, a vessel that had been commissioned as a privateer by 
the King of Spain, for attacking a United States vessel; the owner of the Palmyra asserted that the vessel 
could not be forfeited until he was convicted of privateering, but the Supreme Court rejected his de-
fense.). 
18 Bennis, 516 U.S. at 448. 
19 Id. at 465 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 466. 
22 Id. at 458. 
23 O’Harrow, supra note 4. 
24 Id. 
25 CARPENTER II, supra note 4, at 5 & 29. 
26 Id. at 5. 
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Civil forfeiture perpetuates an injustice that punishes innocent American 
property owners. Supporters contend civil forfeiture prevents further illicit 
use of the property and renders the illegal behavior unprofitable.27 Despite 
the view that civil forfeiture is a powerful deterrent to crime, it serves as an 
increasingly critical revenue source for law enforcement, calling for fear of 
incentivized abuse. As President George H.W. Bush boasted, “[a]sset for-
feiture laws allow the government to take the ill-gotten gains of drug king-
pins and use them to put more cops on the streets.”28 Civil forfeiture is as-
sociated with far fewer procedural safeguards than criminal law, and, as 
described above, affected property owners are often not criminals. 
A. Federal Landscape 
On its face, civil forfeiture seems like a clear violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s mandate that a person cannot “be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”29 Despite this constitutional corner-
stone, Title 18 of the U.S. Code creates a framework of offenses and proce-
dures governing the practice of civil forfeiture.30 In civil forfeiture cases, 
the Court has repeatedly held due process only requires the agency to give a 
property owner of ordinary intelligence reasonable opportunity to know 
what conduct is prohibited before forfeiting the property.31 When law en-
forcement establishes probable cause of the property’s involvement in the 
suspected commission of a crime,32 it may seize the property without exe-
cuting a warrant; the property can then be forfeited without a criminal 
charge or conviction.33 Publication in a newspaper serves as notice and if a 
property owner files a claim to contest the forfeiture within the answer pe-
riod, long, drawn-out civil hearings commence.34 
                                                
27 Bennis, 516 U.S. at 465. 
28 President George H.W. Bush, Remarks at the Attorney General's Summit on Law Enforcement, Re-
sponses to Violent Crime, Fed. News Serv. (Mar. 5, 1991). 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
30 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 983 (2012); see also 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2002) (Notwithstanding 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.) 
31 See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 448.; see also U.S. v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark Fins, 520 F.3d 
976 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
32 ABOVE THE LAW:  AN INVESTIGATION OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE IN CALIFORNIA, 
3, 
https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Drug_Policy_Alliance_Above_the_Law_Civil_Asset_For
feiture_in_California.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2016) (stating that probable cause is the lowest standard 
of proof in the American judicial system). 
33 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2012). 
34 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2009). 
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In the 1990s, Congress expanded jurisdiction in civil forfeiture proceed-
ings to include the district “in which any of the acts or omissions giving rise 
to the forfeiture occurred.”35 Venue rules permit this broadened scope by 
allowing forfeiture proceedings to advance in the district where the forfei-
ture occurs, where the property is found, or where the property is trans-
ported, making it difficult for innocent property owners to recover their for-
feited assets.36 If no one contests a civil forfeiture, that forfeiture can be 
carried out administratively, without the involvement of a court.37 The Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation quips,  
Many criminals are motivated by greed and the acquisition of material goods. 
Therefore, the ability of the government to forfeit property connected with 
criminal activity can be an effective law enforcement tool by reducing the in-
centive for illegal conduct.38   
While seemingly well intentioned, it is clear from the current state of af-
fairs that civil forfeiture has gone awry. 
B. Virginia Landscape 
Four common problems perpetuate the injustice of civil forfeiture: the 
low burden of proof to seize assets, the low burden of proof to forfeit assets 
under contest, placing the burden to prove a property’s innocence on the 
property owner, and law enforcement agency forfeiture sharing.39 Under 
current Virginia civil forfeiture laws, which the Institute for Justice claims 
are “some of the worst civil forfeiture laws in the nation,” police must only 
show probable cause to seize property without a warrant.40 The government 
then needs to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property 
has a suspected connection to a criminal activity, and 100% of forfeiture 
proceeds go to the law enforcement agency responsible.41 
When state law doesn’t allow for a seizure, the policing agency can take 
the property through equitable sharing. Equitable sharing gives police the 
option of seizing assets under lax federal forfeiture laws when state law 
doesn’t allow such a seizure and then funnels up to 80% of the assets to the 
                                                
35 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
36 28 U.S.C. § 1395 (2015). 
37 David Pimentel, Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal Court, 13 NEV. L.J. 
1, 7 (2012). 
38 FBI ON CIVIL FORFEITURE, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white_collar/asset-forfeiture 
(last visited 
Feb. 5, 2016). 
39 CARPENTER, supra note 4, at 43. 
40 Id.; Commonwealth v. Thomas, 43 Va. Cir. 335, 336 (1997). 
41 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-386.1, 19.2-382.10.; CARPENTER II, supra note 4, at 138. 
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seizing police agency.42 In other words, a law enforcement agency can pull 
a person over, cite to probable cause, search the vehicle, find some cash, 
seize the cash under state or federal law, fill the agency’s coffers, and then 
spend that cash however it would like, with virtually no limitations or 
transparency. Following an uproar over distressed law enforcement budg-
ets, the Justice Department recently resumed this controversial practice after 
a brief suspension.43 
Once property is seized under civil forfeiture laws, the property owner’s 
only recourse is to hire an attorney within the time period specified in the 
government’s notice and provide an innocent owner’s defense. An innocent 
owner’s defense requires the individual to prove: she is innocent, she is the 
owner of such property, she was unaware of the conduct giving rise to for-
feiture, and she did all that reasonably could be expected under the circum-
stances to terminate such use of the property.44 All the while, the police re-
tain the property, the proceeding is usually advanced without a judge and 
the innocent property owner is forced to pay legal fees, fully aware that the 
success rate for winning back forfeited property is quite low.45 Nearly $26 
million of the $62 million in assets seized by Virginia law enforcement 
from 2008 to 2015 have been disbursed to the law enforcement agencies 
that conducted the seizure, so far.46 The civil forfeiture process incentivizes 
bad policing as officers experience personal gain and are more likely to 
seize assets. 
                                                
42 ABOVE THE LAW, supra note 32. 
43 Christopher Ingraham, The Feds Have Resumed A Controversial Program That Lets Cops Take Stuff 
and Keep It, 
WASHINGTON POST, (Mar. 28, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/28/the-feds-have-resumed-a-controversial-
program-that-lets-cops-take-stuff-and-keep-it/. 
44 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2009). 
45 See CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE: 7 THING YOU SHOULD KNOW, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/03/civil-asset-forfeiture-7-things-you-should-know (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
46 Mark Bowes, Virginia Forfeiture Laws Come Under Scrutiny, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH 
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III. VIRGINIA HOUSE BILL 48 AND THE FUTURE OF CIVIL FORFEITURE IN 
VIRGINIA 
A.  Virginia House Bill 48 
Concerned about the broad effect of forfeiture laws, Delegate Mark L. 
Cole (R-House District 88), along with Delegates Marshall, Landes, 
LaRock and LeMunyon, introduced House Bill 48 in the 2016 Session of 
the Virginia General Assembly. If passed, House Bill 48 would have 
amended Virginia civil forfeiture laws by raising the burden of proof to stay 
the forfeiture until the Commonwealth establishes a required finding of 
guilt.47 For at least the past several years, the Virginia General Assembly 
has attempted, and repeatedly failed, to reform the Commonwealth’s civil 
asset forfeiture laws.48 Last year was no different and Cole’s bill failed by a 
vote of 47-50.49 House Bill 48 did not go far enough, but it did address one 
major concern surrounding civil forfeiture laws. In part, the bill required: 
Any action of forfeiture commenced under this section shall be stayed until the 
court in which the owner of the property is being prosecuted for an offense 
authorizing the forfeiture finds the owner guilty of such offense, and any prop-
erty eligible for forfeiture under the provisions of any statute shall be forfeited 
only upon such finding of the owner's guilt, regardless of whether the owner 
has been sentenced. If no such finding is made by the court, all property seized 
shall be released from seizure.50 
 One likely reason House Bill 48 failed was the passage of Senate 
Bill 457. In proving that the property is subject to civil forfeiture, Virginia 
Senate Bill 457 raised the Commonwealth’s burden of proof from prepon-
derance of the evidence to “clear and convincing evidence.”51 Senate Bill 
                                                
47 H.B. 48, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (unenacted), available at 
http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi- bin/legp604.exe?161+ful+HB48. 
48 E.g., Travis Fain, Virginia’s Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Effort Goes Down Again, DAILY PRESS, 
April 15, 2015, http://www.dailypress.com/news/politics/dp-virginias-civil-asset-forfeiture-reform-
effort-goes-down-again-20150415-story.html; 2016 SESSION HB 48 FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 
USED IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMMISSION OF CRIMES; FINDING OF GUILT 
REQUIRED, http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?161+vot+HV0653+HB0048 (last visited Mar. 
18, 2016) (The Virginia House of Delegates defeated the bill by a vote of 47-50 in 2016). 
49 2016 SESSION HB 48 FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY USED IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
COMMISSION OF CRIMES; FINDING OF GUILT REQUIRED, http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-
bin/legp604.exe?161+vot+HV0653+HB0048 (last visited Mar. 18, 2016) (The Virginia House of Dele-
gates defeated the bill by a vote of 47-50 in 2016). 
50 H.B. 48, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (unenacted), available at 
http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi- bin/legp604.exe?161+ful+HB48. 
51 S.B. 457, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (unenacted), available at 
https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi- bin/legp604.exe?161+sum+SB457 (amending § 19.2-386.10) (The Virginia 
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457 is a smaller step in the right direction, but clear and convincing evi-
dence is a lower burden of proof than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” like 
House Bill 48 would have established by requiring a guilty verdict. 
B.  The Future of Civil Forfeiture in Virginia 
The concerns surrounding civil forfeiture can be mitigated while the 
Commonwealth still earns money and deters crime. The Virginia General 
Assembly should consider (1) shifting the burden of proof to the govern-
ment to prove the property owner’s consent or knowledge of the crime lead-
ing to the seizure of property beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) transferring all 
funds attributable to civil forfeiture to a general fund, which then can be 
administered to law enforcement with oversight; (3) requiring more detailed 
reports on civil forfeitures and (4) recognizing civil forfeiture as a punitive 
measure for all purposes, calling for the application of normal standards of 
due process. With these reforms, property could only be forfeited upon a 
showing of guilt and the presumption would be against the Commonwealth, 
but law enforcement agencies could continue effectively removing criminal 
assets from crime.52 
In addition to legislative reform, the courts can make two simple im-
provements: (1) focus proceedings on unjust enrichment and (2) establish 
standards for assessing when forfeitures constitute excessive fines.53 Legis-
lative history demonstrates that the purpose of civil forfeiture was to take 
the profit out of crime, not to add punitive fines to punishments.54 Staying 
true to this policy objective will help eliminate some of the injustices dis-
cussed above. Furthermore, using standards to assess excessive fines would 
likely protect innocent property owners, like the wife in Bennis, while con-
tinuing to remove assets from crime. The Fifth Amendment exists to protect 
property owners from Government; without reform, current civil forfeiture 
practices deny normal due process to innocent property owners and defeat 
their rights to property ownership. 
                                                                                                             
General assembly passed the bill on March 10, 2016 and the Governor must sign by April 10, 2016 to 
become law); see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-386.1 (1991). 
52 Donald J. Kochan, REFORMING PROPERTY FORFEITURE LAWS TO PROTECT CITIZENS’ 
RIGHTS, 31 (Mackinac Center for Public Policy, 1998). 
53 David Pimentel, Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal Court, 13 NEV. L.J. 
1, 36, 53 (2012). 
54 Id. at 52. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Political philosopher, Frederic Bastiat, wrote that the law should ex-
ist to protect life, liberty, and property, but often it is perverted into a means 
of “legal plunder.” The United States should strive to deter crime, but not at 
the expense of ‘uncivilly’ taking the assets of innocent property owners. 
Unfortunately, financial incentives through civil forfeitures incentivize 
overreaching and many property owners are reluctant to contest the pro-
ceeding due to fear of stacked decks, self-incrimination, and overhead 
costs.55 Failure to contest forfeitures allows state governments to seize large 
amounts of property administratively, without a hearing or traditional due 
process.56 
When the United States Constitution was adopted, common law did not 
endorse using civil asset forfeiture against domestic citizens, therefore, one 
would think the use of civil forfeiture to forfeit domestic property would be 
unconstitutional.57 Reformers had hoped the temporary suspension of equi-
table sharing was a signal that the Department of Justice was looking to rein 
in the practice, but law enforcement groups became enraged over budget 
concerns and members of Congress called for restoration of the payments.58 
With Congress feeling reluctant to reform the controversial practices of 
civil forfeiture and equitable sharing, reform largely falls on the states and 
courts. Courts can change policies to ensure more just civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings, while states can amend their respective practices. The Virginia 
General Assembly had the chance to make a great impact on this form of 
government taking, but instead settled for a slightly heightened standard of 
proof.59 The new standard is certainly an improvement over the current 
standard, but the effectiveness of the new “clear and convincing evidence” 
burden of proof is hard to predict. 
In one of the Court’s earliest decisions, Chief Justice Marshall recog-
nized as “unquestionably a correct legal principle” that “a forfeiture can 
                                                
55 CARPENTER II, supra note 4, at 11-12. 
56 Id at 13. 
57 Compare The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 12 (1827) (civil forfeiture being used against a foreign privateer) 
with Bennis, 516 U.S. at 453 (the Court held cases authorizing actions of the kind at issue are too firmly 
fixed in the jurisprudence of the country). 
58 Christopher Ingraham, The Feds Have Resumed a Controversial Program That Lets Cops Take Stuff 
and Keep It, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 28, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/ 
2016/03/28/the-feds-have-resumed-a-controversial-program-that-lets-cops-take-stuff-and-keep-it/. 
59 Compare S.B. 457, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (unenacted), available at 
https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?161+sum+SB457 with H.B. 48, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Va. 2016) (unenacted), available at http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?161+ful+HB48. 
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only be applied to those cases in which the means that are prescribed for the 
prevention of a forfeiture may be employed.”60 In other words, a person 
cannot be punished for doing no wrong. Moving forward, legislatures must 
undertake thorough re-examination of these doctrines and adopt a new ap-
proach, consisting of separate procedures, limited law enforcement sharing, 
more transparency, and distinct burdens of proof placed on government. 
Until then, legal scholars and students can enjoy entertaining case titles, like 
United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark Fins.61 
                                                
60 Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. 347, 363 (1808); see also Bennis, 516 U.S. at 467. 
61 United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark Fins, 520 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 
2008)(Government brought a civil action against cargo of shark fins on basis of an alleged violation of 
the Shark Finning Prohibition Act). 
12
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 8
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol20/iss3/8
